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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/03/2004 Accident number: 372 
Accident time: 09:35 Accident Date: 28/08/2001 




Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Other Date of main report: 12/09/2001 
ID original source: BOI: No 012/2001 Name of source: KMACC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMA-3 AP blast Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
leaf litter 
trees 
Date record created: 22/02/2004 Date  last modified: 22/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: DN 34963 01785  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east: GR 34T Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
vegetation clearance problem (?) 
mechanical follow-up (?) 




What follows is the report of a Board of Inquiry investigation that was made available in 
January 2002. It has been edited for anonymity. 
 
REPORT FOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD OF INQUIRY – No 012/2001 
Mine Accident that occurred in MNB West on Tuesday 28 August 2001 in which [the 
Demining group’s] Task Site Leader [the Victim] was injured. 
 
Introduction 
1)  In accordance with the Mine Action Co-ordination Centre (MACC) Standard Working 
Procedure No 4, the MACC Programme Manager issued a Convening Order on Tuesday 28 
August 2001 for an Accident Investigation Board of Inquiry.  Annex A details the Convening 
Order. 
2)  This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry into the mine accident that 
occurred on Tuesday 28 August 2001.  Based on the investigation, interviews, statements 
from [the Demining group’s] personnel involved in the accident, visits and photos of the 
accident site, this accident is considered to be preventable. 
3)  This finding is based on the fact that at the time of the accident the Task Site Leader [The 
Victim] intentionally stepped over the base stick into an uncleared area and then 
subsequently stepped on an anti-personnel blast mine. 
4)  The accident occurred at one of the Rasa Koshare minefield’s, Task Dossier Number 
W02-37, minefield number 315, GR 34T DN 34963 01785 on 28 August 2001 at 09:35 hours. 
 
Events leading up to the Accident 
5)  All [the Demining group’s] manual clearance teams are conducting operations in the 
Rasha Koshare minefields.  There are now only two minefields left to clear, minefield 
numbers 366 and 315.   Minefield number 315 has been divided into three areas and each 
area is supervised by a National Task Site Leader, with The Victim being one of them.  The 
[demining group] Bozena Team had conducted operations in minefield 315 and had 
previously cleared a number of access lanes through the dense scrub to the mine rows.  The 
Victim was responsible for one clearance lane only. This lane continued on from one of the 
Bozena cleared access lanes. 
6)  On the morning of the accident at approximately 09:25hrs the Victim was informed by the 
section leader  that one of his deminers [name excised] had seen a tripwire to the front of his 
base stick.  [The Team Leader]  then directed that both the deminer and section leader return 
to the base line at the start of the Bozena cleared access lane.  [The Team Leader] then 
proceeded to step over the base stick at the end of the lane into the uncleared area.  He has 
stated he did this in order to investigate the tripwire and identify the location of the PMR2A 
fragmentation mine.  No one witnessed him at this time, and at 09:35hrs an uncontrolled 
detonation was heard in the location of where [the Victim] had walked. 
7)  On hearing the explosion [two named deminers] entered the lane and saw that [the Victim] 
was injured and had made his way to the base stick from the uncleared area. He was then 
placed on a stretcher and taken to the base line. The Victim had suffered a traumatic blast 
injury to his left foot.  A KFOR helicopter CASEVAC was requested through the MNB (W) 
senior partner, to HLS Red – 26.  The medical team was waiting at the baseline and provided 
[the Victim] with first aid treatment.  Once stabilised he was then taken by ambulance to the 
HLS approximately 1 km down the hill. 
8)  The helicopter arrived at the HLS at 09:50hrs, and was waiting for the casualty to arrive by 
ambulance from the minefield.  The helicopter departed at 0957hrs with the casualty and 
team medic to the Italian KFOR Field Hospital in Peja arriving at 1007hrs.  The Italian doctors 
assessed [the Victim’s] condition and as there was a possibility of saving his foot, they 
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decided to transfer him to the Pristina Civilian Hospital.  This hospital has a very good plastic 
surgeon that is able to provide suitable treatment to [the Victim’s] foot. 
9)  This is the sixth mine accident that [the demining group] have had since May of this year, 
and their third for this particular minefield. 
10)  The seat of the explosion was at a distance of approximately 10m from the end of the 
clearance lane.  Therefore in order to safely continue the investigation, an access lane was 
manually cleared to the location of the explosion.  There was evidence at the seat of 
explosion that the mine involved was a PMA3 anti-personnel blast mine. 
 
11)  Upon investigation it was apparent that [the Victim] had cleared the surface leaves away 
where he placed his feet as he walked out into the uncleared area.  There was no evidence of 
any marking or other approved methods of clearance where [he] had walked. 
 
[The picture above shows the accident lane. The accident happened in front of the cleared 
area.] 
There was evidence of where the Victim had cleared small areas of leaves in which to place 
his feet when walking out into the uncleared area. 
 
[The photograph below shows the seat of explosion after a lane had been cleared to the 
place.] 
 
Work History of the Casualty 
12)  The Victim has been working for [the demining group] since August 1999, and he is 
considered to be one of the more experienced Task Site Leaders. 
 
Past History of the Area 
13)  The accident site is Task Dossier W02 – 37, at minefield number 315.  The minefields in 
this task dossier are all in the Rasa Koshare area, which is on the Kosovo – Albanian border.  
There was heavy fighting in this location during the war and there are numerous minefields 
along this border area.  The minefields contain anti-personnel mines of both fragmentation 
and blast, and are predominantly laid in very high densities. 
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14)  [Another demining group] conducted clearance operations in this minefield from July – 
November 2000.  There have been a total of four mine accidents in this minefield since 
clearance commenced in July 2000.  The [other demining group] had a mine accident in 
November of 2000 and this is the third mine accident that [this demining group] have had 
since taking over from [the other demining group] in this minefield. 
15)  Due to the difficult conditions around the stream and swampy areas of this minefield, 
these areas are to be fenced off and left uncleared. 
 
Sequence, Documentation and Procedure of Tasking 
16)  The Task Dossier No W02-37 was issued to [the demining group] on 17 February 2001.  
As stated this was a minefield that [another demining group] had previously conducted 
clearance in, although had not completed. 
 
Geography and Weather 
17) The area in general is the Kosovo – Albanian Border approximately 25km NW of Gjakova.  
The border region around this area is mountainous and covered with forest and bush.  The 
road access to this site is through the village of Junik.  The route from here is a 12km very 
uneven gravel road which winds its’ way up to the minefield.  The minefield is heavily 
vegetated with low scrub and large trees.  The weather at the time of the accident was fine 
with a temperature of approximately 25 degrees Celsius. 
 
Site Layout and Marking 
18)  The site layout and marking at the site was in accordance with the [demining group’s] 
SOPs for mine clearance.  This minefield is on a hillside, and the area in which the accident 
occurred is approximately 50m west of the dirt road that leads to the upper minefields in the 
Rasha Koshare area.  According to the Vojska Jugoslavije (VJ) minefield record, there are 
three mine rows containing PMR 2A fragmentation mines with PMA3 blast mines as keepers.  
The mine rows are running generally up the hill in a northerly direction. 
 
Management Supervision and Discipline 
19)  [The demining group’s] direct supervision on site is achieved by three National Task Site 
Leaders and a National Task Site Supervisor.  There is a National Senior Demining 
Supervisor that oversees the supervision of all demining sites, and managing all [the 
demining group’s] clearance operations is an International Operations Officer. 
20)  The Victim was one of the three National Task Site Leaders at this minefield. 
 
Quality Assurance and Quality Control 
21)  [The demining group’s] Quality Control is achieved through a system of on-site checks by 
the Section Leaders and Task Site Leaders to ensure adherence to the mine clearance 
SOPs.  The MACC QA teams conduct external Quality Assurance on a regular basis, 
normally each site is visited a minimum of once per week. 
 
Communications and Reporting 
22)  At the time of the accident there was effective communication by VHF hand-held 
Motorola radios between the Section Leaders and Task Site Supervisor on their internal net.  
There was further communication by hand-held VHF radios from the team site, and [the 
demining group’s] base situated in Hereq also on the [demining group’s] internal net.  The 
communications between call sign 52, call sign 51 and call sign kilo foxtrot (KFOR) is on the 
MNB (W) VHF channel 4. 
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23)  At the time of the accident the MACC QA Team Leader and MACC QA Officer were in 
the region and monitored all communications in regards to the accident on the MNB (W) 
channel.  The MACC QA Team Leader was at the HLS when the CASEVAC helicopter took 
the casualty to the Italian KFOR Field Hospital in Peja. 
 
Medical Details 
24)  The Victim has suffered moderate injuries to his left foot and was initially taken to the 
Italian KFOR Field Hospital in Peja.  He was assessed, and as there was the possibility of not 
having to amputate the foot, he was then taken by helicopter to the civilian hospital in Pristina 
in order to receive more suitable treatment from specialist doctors.  Annex D details the 
medical report from the MACC QA Medical Officer. 
 
Personnel 
25)  A list of personnel and their duties is detailed at Annex D to the [demining group’s] 
Preliminary Investigation Report. Written statements from the personnel involved in the 
accident form the Appendices to this Annex. 
 
Dress and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
26)  At the time of the accident [the Victim] was wearing personal protective equipment in 
accordance with [the demining group’s] SOPs. 
 
Tools and Equipment  
27)  The Victim was not using any tools at the time of the accident. 
 
Details of Mine Involved 
28)  [A PMA fact-sheet including disarming procedures was pasted here.] 
 
Account of Activities 
29)  The following is a description of the events from the time of the accident until the casualty 
was at the hospital: 
Tuesday 28 August 2001 
• 0925hrs – [The Victim] informs the deminer [name excised] and the section leader 
[name excised] to return to the base line. 
• 0935hrs – An uncontrolled detonation is heard in the vicinity of where [the Victim] has 
walked. 
• 0937hrs – 52 calls 51 (senior partner MNB (W)) and reports the accident detail and 
requests a helicopter to HLS Red - 26.  51 then calls kilo foxtrot and passes the 
relevant information for the helicopter CASEVAC.  First Aid medical treatment is 
given to [the Victim] by team medics and he is transported by ambulance to HLS Red 
– 26. 
• 0950hrs – Helicopter arrives at HLS Red - 26. 
• 0954hrs – Casualty arrives at HLS Red – 26 and is loaded into the helicopter. 
• 0957hrs – Casualty is taken by helicopter to Italian KFOR Field Hospital in Peja. 
• 1007hrs – CASEVAC helicopter arrives at Italian KFOR hospital. Initial examination is 
conducted of the casualty and it is then decided to take him to Pristina civilian 
hospital for specialist treatment in order to save his foot. 
5 
• 1235hrs – Casualty arrives at Pristina civilian hospital by helicopter from Peja.  
 
Insurance Details 
30)  The Victim is covered by the [demining group’s] personal insurance it has for all staff.  All 
insurance policies for [the demining group] are through Willis Insurance Group of London.  A 
copy of the insurance detail is kept in the MACC QA Office. 
 
Conclusions 
31)  Based on the investigation, interviews, the statements and visits to the site, the Board of 
Inquiry concludes the following: 
• The Victim committed a serious breach of [Demining group’s] SOPs by intentionally 
walking into an uncleared mined area and subsequently stepped on a PMA3 anti-
personnel blast mine. 
• He suffered moderate injuries to his left foot, and there is a possibility that the 
specialist doctors in Pristina Hospital will be able to save it. 
• The three mine rows as well as the end of these rows were clearly identified.  
Therefore the uncleared area in which [the Victim] walked into was a known mined 
area that contained PMR2A fragmentation mines as well as PMA3 blast mines. 
• [The Victim] has stated the reason he walked into the minefield was to identify the 
location of the PMR2A fragmentation mine. 
• This minefield was divided into three separate areas, which was directly supervised 
by three National Task Site Leaders.  The Victim was one of the three Task Site 
Leaders and he was responsible for one clearance lane only. 
• The Victim through his actions displayed a complete disregard for [the demining 
group’s] SOPs and incredibly irrational behaviour.  This is certainly not what is 
expected of a person in his position and responsibility. 
• The first aid provided to [the Victim] on site by the team medics was to a high 
standard. 
• The CASEVAC procedure went extremely well, with the helicopter at the HLS within 
13 minutes of KFOR being notified, and the casualty arriving at the next medical 
facility within 30 minutes of the accident. 
 
Recommendations 
32)  The following are recommendations based on the Board of Inquiry conclusions: 
• [The Demining group] very seriously consider the retention of the Victim within their 
organisation in order to provide an appropriate precedence for this blatant disregard 
of procedures and totally irresponsible act. 
• The [Demining group] medics are to be commended for their continued high degree 
of medical support. 
• The Italian KFOR be commended for their very swift response in getting the casualty 
to the hospital. 
Signed: UNMIK Mine Action Co-ordination Centre 
Quality Assurance Officer 
 
Annexes: [not made available] 
A. MACC convening order for accident investigation Board of Inquiry. 
B. Map of the general area. 
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C. Schematic diagram of the general accident area. 
D. Medical report from the MACC QA Officer. 
 
Attachment: 
[Demining group’s] Preliminary Investigation Report [Not made available] 
 
Comments by the MACC Chief Operations Officer 
The findings of this Board of Inquiry are agreed and concurred with. 
• Whilst [the Demining Group] have had a number of accidents in the past, these are 
and have been considered against the backdrop of the high density minefields that 
they are working in and their continuing technical difficulty. This latest accident goes 
beyond these considerations and may be attributed to an unnecessary act of “sheer 
bravado” on the part of [the Victim]. 
• The fact that the injuries sustained are relatively light and that [the Victim] may retain 
the use of his injured foot is to be considered extremely fortunate. [The Demining 
group] are urged to take immediate action, within their mine clearance teams, to 
ensure that this foolish, and unnecessary accident, is not repeated. 
Signed: UNMIK Mine Action Co-ordination Centre, Chief of Operations  
 
Comments by the MACC Programme Manager 
The conclusions and recommendations of this Board of Inquiry, along with the comments by 
the MACC Chief Operations Officer are fully concurred with. 
Signed: UNMIK Mine Action Co-ordination Centre, Programme Manager 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 477 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 3 hours 10 minutes 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: Worn, type not 
recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
severe Foot 
COMMENT 
No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
This accident classification is listed as “Other” because the Victim was not engaged in a 
normal demining act. As a site supervisor, he was mine-hunting in the uncleared area. The 
primary cause is listed as a “Field Control inadequacy” because the Victim was a field 
controller and behaved in breach of accepted SOPs. The secondary cause is listed as a 
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“Management/control inadequacy” because senior management were responsible for 
selecting field supervisors and for ensuring they wee adequately trained. Either the victim was 
poorly selected or his training was inadequate. 
The inadequate medical provision listed in the notes refers to the unacceptable time that it 
took for the victim to reach hospital. 
 
8 
